Momaw wrote:
You make an interesting point, and it seems plausible. Though I might point out that when deployed en masse, accuracy is (within sensible boundaries) less important than speed. You didn't need to train a slinger to be able to kill a running wolf if he's got a standing division for a target. I mean, if you've got a thousand soldiers all slinging at a block of another thousand soldiers, an error of plus or minus a couple of feet at range just means you hit the guy's buddies. Same with early musketry. Get enough soldiers together all shooting in the same direction at the same time, and they don't need to be crack shots; somebody's going to hit something through sheer saturation.
Here’s an example where slingers weren’t facing solid blocks of enemy infantry. I steal from Wikipedia describing the Battle of Gaugamela, the last of the battles Darius fought against Alexander.
During the battle Alexander used an unusual strategy which has been duplicated only a few times throughout history. His plan was to draw as much of the Persian cavalry as possible to the flanks. The purpose of this was to create a gap within the enemy line where a decisive blow could then be struck at Darius in the center. This required almost perfect timing and maneuvering, and the Great King himself to act first. Alexander would force Darius to attack (as they would soon move off the prepared ground) though Darius did not want to be the first to attack after seeing what happened at Issus against a similar formation. In the end Darius's hand was forced, and he attacked…
As the Persians moved farther and farther to the Macedonian flanks in their attack, Alexander slowly filtered in his rear-guard. Alexander disengaged his Companions, and prepared for the decisive attack on the Persians. Leading the way, he formed his units into a giant wedge, with him leading the charge. Behind them were the guards brigade along with any phalanx battalions he could withdraw from the battle. These were follow-up light troops. Alexander took most of his cavalry and moved parallel to Darius's front lines, heading off of the prepared battlefield. In doing so, Darius ordered his cavalry in the front lines to block Alexander's force. Unbeknownst to Darius, Alexander hid a force of peltasts (light infantry armed with slings, javelins, and shortbows) behind his horsemen and Alexander slowly sent his force into an angle, heading toward the Persian host, until finally a gap opened between Bessus's left and Darius's center and Alexander sent in his cavalry force to drive down the gap in the Persian line in a wedge formation. At the same time, the peltasts engaged the cavalry, so as to keep them from riding back to engage Alexander's charging cavalry. The infantry at the center was still fighting the phalanxes, hindering any attempts to counter Alexander's charge.
Alexander’s tactics had scattered the Persian cavalry. That’s how he created an opening through which he pushed his forces, breaking the unity of the Persian line of battle. But to make this work he depended upon his peltasts, which included slingers. If they failed him, the Persian cavalry could take his push in the flank and crush it. Those slingers weren’t aiming at running wolves. They were aiming at galloping cavalrymen. Granted, they were bigger than wolves. But they were more dangerous as well.
